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TRANSPLANTS – BIOETHICS AND JUSTICE
Claudio Cohen and José Ricardo Meirelles
COHEN C et al. - Transplants – bioethics and justice. Rev. Hosp. Clín. Fac. Med. S. Paulo 58(6):293-298, 2003.
Bioethics, as a branch of philosophy that focuses on questions relative to health and human life, is closely tied to the
idea of justice and equality. As such, in understanding the concept of equality in its original sense, that is, in associating it
to the idea to treat “unequals” (those who are unequal or different, in terms of conditions or circumstances) unequally
(differentially), in proportion to their inequalities (differences), we see that the so-called “one-and-only waiting list” for
transplants established in law no. 9.434/97, ends up not addressing the concept of equality and justice, bearing upon
bioethics, even when considering the objective criteria of precedence established in regulation no. 9.4347/98, Thus, the
organizing of transplants on a one-and-only waiting list, with a few exceptions that are weakly applicable, without a case by
case technical and grounded analysis, according to each particular necessity, ends up institutionalizing inequalities,
condemning patients to happenstance and, consequently, departs from the ratio legis, which aims at seeking the greatest
application of justice in regards to organ transplants. We conclude, therefore, that from an analysis of the legislation and of
the principles of bioethics and justice, there is a need for the creation of a collegiate of medical experts, that, based on
medical criteria and done in a well established manner, can analyze each case to be included on the waiting list, deferentially
and according to the necessity; thus, precluding that people in special circumstances be treated equal to people in normal
circumstances.
DESCRIPTORS: Bioethics. Ethics. Equality. Justice. Lei 9.434/97. One-and-one waiting list. Transplants. Regulation
3.407/98 .
In this paper we will analyze the
transplant law and the regulation that
was established in light of the princi-
ples of justice and equality that focus
on bioethics, seeking especially to
analyze the intrinsic parameters that
apply to the so-called ”one-and-only
waiting list” for recipients of organs.
Therefore, it seems of fundamental im-
portance that the concepts be well de-
lineated, in a natural interdisciplinary
manner in dealing with the proposed
theme, making it patent that we make
manifest our inconformity to the epis-
temological rupture, where fragmented
scientific knowledge leads to the aban-
donment of common sense in
multidisciplinary knowledge that
honors and disciplines rationality. In
order to “defragmentize” the scientific
knowledge, considering here, the var-
ied arguments necessary in examining
the question aired, it behooves us that
the interdisciplinary approach be fun-
damental in the formation of our think-
ing, although there does not exist neu-
tral knowledge, or that is, there is al-
ways a certain amount of subjectivity
in scientific studies; this being human
nature.
BIOETHICS  AND  JUSTICE
To Segre1, bioethics is that part of
ethics, a branch of philosophy, that
focuses on questions relative to human
life (and, hence, to health).
Likewise, in an in-depth study on
the subject, Cohen2 defines bioethics
as an ethical comprehension of the
questions relative to health and hu-
man life, and continues, citing think-
ers of the “Kennedy Institute of
Ethics”(EEUU), adducing that
bioethics is based on three principles:
autonomy, beneficence and non-ma-
levolence and justice, with the con-
cept of justice being understood as the
collective welfare and not as contrac-
tual liberty, in which power is deter-
mined by the reciprocity, without sub-
jection and subordination, unless the
lord and master of all, by some mani-
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fest declaration of his will, had distin-
guished one above the others and un-
equivocally bestowed upon him, by
indicating clearly and evidently, the
rights of a master and sovereign3, de-
parting further from the Aristotelian
concept of natural apportionment.
It is pointed out, however, that
bioethics, as well as ethics, (of which
it is a part) is closely related to the idea
of justice, that understood as collective
welfare, ends up bringing to the sur-
face the necessity of discussion, re-
garding the principle of equality.
THE CONCEPT OF EQUALITY
It is said that, although it is not
understood what equality is, it is much
desired (Lucas4), to the point of be-
coming an obsession of political
thinking. Rui Barbosa, in his Oração
aos Moços (Prayer to the Boys), invok-
ing the Aristotelian concept, stated
that equality and inequality are both
rights, according to the hypotheses;
equality when it is a matter of a fun-
damental right, and inequalities, when
they fall into a category of acquired
rights. Rights are fundamental when
they apply to man for being man, in-
dependently of any acquisitive act.
They are the essence of the individual
human being, as are the rights to life,
liberty, security and property. Acquired
rights are those that each man has, in
virtue of the acquisitive act: to work,
to inherit, to buy, to donate, to find
something and others that the law may
comprehend as creators of sources of
rights. In light of acquired rights, all
are equal. However, in either case, the
treatment of the law is equal for all the
citizens in the same conditions5 and
complete, the rule for equality does
not consist in only apportioning un-
equally to unequals, to the proportion
that they become unequal.
We verify that many times (if not
in the majority) equality is achieved
by way of unequal treatment, or, that
is to say, laws are created to guaran-
tee inequality and not equality, giving
the appearance of equality to an in-
equality in which it is affirmed6.
Although it is known that equality
does not receive uniform treatment in
what is referred to as its concep-
tualization, when, on the one hand, it
follows a liberal line of reasoning,
which gives a major emphasis to lib-
erty and then, on the other hand, a
Marxist one, which emphasizes iso-
nomy proper, the fact is that as much
as our constitution tries to achieve, as
a democratic ideal, material equality
and not only formal equality – before
the law -, human beings do have dif-
ferences that should be respected, tak-
ing into consideration the notion of
respecting inequalities. Ignacio
Burgoa7 adduces under the epigraph
“juridical idea of equality“ that juridi-
cally, equality is expressed such that
various persons, undetermined in
number, in a determined situation,
have the possibility and capacity to be
entitled qualitatively to the same
rights and to contract the same obli-
gations that emanate from that said
condition. In other words, equality,
from a juridical point of view, is mani-
fested in the possibility and the ca-
pacity that several people, numeri-
cally undetermined, acquire the rights
and contract the obligations derived
from the certain and determined situ-
ation in which they are found.
Moreover, it is not difficult to note
that the concept of equality, respect-
ing inequalities, is closely correlated
to the previously mentioned principle
of justice, guided by ethics and origi-
nating from the Latin proverb, Suun
cuique tribuere – Give to each one
what is his – where we add, respecting
their inherent differences. Moreover it
is necessary, as Costa points out, to re-
member that equality as a proposition,
represents a relative “ ought-to-be”,
to the extent that possible equality is
that which is related to rights and their
being put into effect and not to the
characteristics or to the personality,
since, as Bobbio8 well reminds us, one
of the maxims most charged with emo-
tive meaning is that which proclaims
equality to all men, but frequently, at-
tention is not given to the fact that
that which confers an emotional
charge to the enunciation — which
when it is a descriptive proposition, is
excessively generic and even false – is
not the equality proclaimed, but the
extension of equality to include all.
Hence, with the especially wise
concepts having been established of
bioethics, justice and equality that
emanate from the law to guarantee in-
equality (for those in special circum-
stances) and not equality, it behooves
us to analyze the transplant law, as per-
tains to the obligatoriness of obedi-
ence to the one-and-only waiting list,
in such way as to verify if it is indeed
adhering to the principle of justice of
bioethics, modeled after the principle
of equality.
THE TRANSPLANT LAW
With the intent of resolving the
problems that arise with organ trans-
plants in Brazil, in 1997, Law 9,434
was published (04/02/1997) and prom-
ulgated and later changed by Law
10.211, on March of 2001, which re-
scinded Law 8,489 of November of
1992 and Decree no. 879 of July 18,
1992, which is the law which provides
that tissue, organs and parts of the
body, live or post mortem, are made
available on a free basis for the pur-
pose of transplants and medical treat-
ment. Following that, Law 9,434/97,
promulgated Decree 2,268/97 and
Regulation MS no. 3,407/98, which
was the law that sought to regulate the
so-called one-and-only waiting list.
Therefore, besides the provisions
concerning the procedures to be
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adopted for transplants of organs, spe-
cifically in the complementary provi-
sions in its article 10, the Law 9,434/
97 provides, in verbis:
Art. 10 The transplant or graft only
will be done with the expressed con-
sent of the recipient, so enrolled on the
one-and-only waiting list, after
counseling over its exceptional nature
and the and risks of the procedure.
§ 2nd Enrollment on the one-and-
only waiting list does not grant the in-
tended recipient or his family the sub-
jective right to exemption, if the trans-
plant is not carried out due to altera-
tion in the condition of the organs, tis-
sue and parts to be destined to him, as
a result of an accident or an incident
during its transport.” (bold print is our
addition).
With the purpose of making effec-
tive the abovementioned legal articles,
Regulation no. 3,407/98 purports to
regulate the one-and-only list system,
formulating, initially, a one-and-only
list system for each type of organ, body
part or tissue (art.36) – divided as such
into: kidneys, liver, lung, heart and
cornea.
Likewise, patterned after art. 37, §
2nd, of the aforementioned Regulation:
 “§ 2 nd To the degree that the re-
cipient needs diverse organs, the cri-
teria for distribution will be defined
by the organ in greatest demand in
the one-and-only waiting list system.”
(bold print ours).
Finally, to emphasize, Regulation
no. 3,407/98 stipulates the objective
criteria for indication of precedence of
the patient in relation to the one-and-
only list, when there are urgent clini-
cal conditions (art.38), stipulating
these conditions in its art. 40, accord-
ing to each type of organ, i.e., kidney
– lack of access for carrying out a di-
alysis; liver— fulminant hepatitis and
the necessity for re-transplant; lung –
necessity for re-transplant; heart – ne-
cessity for re-transplant; cardiogenic
shock; hospitalization in an intensive
care unit with vasopressor medica-
tion; necessity of mechanical assist-
ance in cardiac activity; cornea –
graft failure; ulcer of the cornea with
no response to treatment; desceme-
tocele; perforation of the eye ball and
a recipient with less that 7 years of
age with bilateral corneal opacity.
Thus, what is known as the trans-
plant law, among others, was inno-
vated, establishing the one-and-only
waiting list, wherewith, the legislators
certainly thought that isonomy and
equality would be respected; whereby,
with the creation of a one-and-only list,
distortions and privileges would be
avoided, treating all individuals equal
who would need a transplant. A one-
and-only list was to be created,
wherein the order of enrollment was to
be observed, and wherewith it would
be guaranteed that the principle of jus-
tice, guided by bioethics, would be
adhered to.
Moreover, with the regulating of
urgent cases, that gave preference to
recipients who were in objective situ-
ations, foreseen by the regulation, it
was expected that problems with ur-
gent cases would be resolved.
We cannot agree with this sophism,
taken as an argument based on
premises considered as being true,
seeming to be a result of formal rules
of reasoning, arriving, however, at an
inadmissible conclusion.
Let us clarify this; in fact, the
premise that the creation of the so-
called one-and only-waiting list was
based on certainly was the necessity
for organization in what has to do with
effecting transplants in Brazil; but, as
it is, without the minimum of organi-
zation, certainly some people could be
privileged at the detriment of others,
even in situations where there is less
serious risk to life. Establishing a one-
and-only list, based on nothing more
than the order of enrollment (a first
come, first served basis), ends up vio-
lating rather than guaranteeing the
principle of equality, in that it ends up
treating equally individuals who are
in unequal situations, especially as
pertains to life expectancy, in cases
where there is the risk of death.
In effect as we pointed out before,
laws are made in order to guarantee in-
equalities and, as such, guarantee, in
essence, the observance of equality.
Only in this way is it possible to speak,
in principle, of justice in bioethics,
since when the law purports to guar-
antee equality in unequal situations, it
ends up institutionalizing inequality.
The effect is just the opposite of what
is expected.
It is what occurs, we contend, con-
cerning the one-and-only list, based on
the order of enrollment of the recipi-
ent, who has to wait his turn to have a
transplant, even if this costs him his
life.
It is not necessary to be an expert
in order to see that the system created
for organizing transplants results in in-
stitutionalizing inequalities, departing
from the principle of justice, and it in-
troduces a new factor, which is unac-
ceptable in its being treated as normal
– luck. Even in the more advanced
countries, the number of donors is al-
ways less than the number of recipi-
ents, such that, whether it be greater of
less, there will always be waiting. It is
necessary, therefore, that there be a list
organizer for this waiting. However,
we contend that the needed organiza-
tion of the list of recipients cannot be
established with the luck of the recipi-
ents as the condition, since although,
in principle, all the recipients are re-
ally in situations of extreme necessity,
some can be in more urgent situations
than others, in what can be as serious
as risk of life and, even then, find them-
selves at the end of the list. The trans-
plant law does not correct these distor-
tions. The pretext for organizing trans-
plants, ends up subjecting recipients to
a factor that is too subjective – luck..
On the other hand, the criteria of §
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2 nd of art. 37 becomes teratological
when it stipulates that the recipient
who needs various organs, will be sub-
mitted to the criteria for distribution of
the organ of greatest demand in the
one-and-only list system. Now, this
very patient, with multiple organ fail-
ure and consequently at the greatest
risk of life, will have to be subjected
to the list of the organ in the greatest
demand, where, generally speaking,
the wait is longer!
Furthermore, the aforementioned
stipulation of objective criteria of pref-
erence does not resolve the problem.
It very timorously defines relevant
clinical criteria – giving priority to
cases of re-transplantation, in which
the recipient is already enrolled on
the one-and-only waiting list, but it
does not include, as it indeed could
not do, all the clinical situations of
risk of death to the patients.
It is not expected that the legal or
infra-legal norm would be able to in-
clude all the possible cases or situa-
tions that could cause the death of a
patient who is on the waiting list. On
the other hand, this is not even the ob-
jective of the Law, which cannot be
deterred by trying to deal with untold
numbers of specific details, at the ex-
pense of excluding relevant situations.
Nevertheless, it is expected that more
comprehensive and just parameters be
established, in which those situations
of precedence also can be analyzed -
that provide greater possibility of life
to those enrolled on waiting lists, try-
ing to obtain the very essence of
bioethics.
Sometimes, the argument is that it
would be impossible to know which
recipient would need the transplant
most urgently, without incurring the
risk of an error, or even what subjec-
tive criteria of necessity could lead to
distortions and favoring, since it is hu-
man nature to favor patients, besides
there being the difficulty of verifying
the validity of information. It is our
opinion that solutions can be found to
these problems.
Initially, it should be pointed out
that the physician, from the first day
that he exercises his profession deals
with risks and the possibility of mak-
ing errors. Risk and the possibility of
errors are inherent to the profession.
What differs from luck is the possibil-
ity of technical analysis and the re-
quirement of a foundation to the di-
agnosis. It is exactly on this point that
we see the advantage of a one-and-
only waiting list (divided up by the
different organs), organized according
to the impending necessity of the re-
cipient and not merely according to
his position of enrollment. A colle-
giate of physicians could be formed
that analyzes each case with all the in-
formation about the patient, and it
would be the duty of the group to es-
tablish, in an systemized and techni-
cal manner, the position of this patient
on the waiting list, that would be valid
for a determined time period, with the
possibility of even re-positioning
when necessary. It is evident that a se-
ries of subjective and supervening fac-
tors could lead to the death of a pa-
tient. However, it is our judgment that
it is still better to have a group of ex-
perts do a case by case analysis for the
purpose of positioning patients on the
list, even if an error could occur, than
to leave a potential recipient to the
mercy of sheer luck or to timorous ob-
jective criteria that have proven not to
exempt cases in which patients are in
danger of dying. Worse than a wrong
diagnosis that, incidentally, when
made unintentionally, does not incur
responsibility, is a lack of an ampler
and more-encompassing diagnosis,
made for the purpose of determining
in which order organs are received -
such a lack, which, in reality, exists at
present. The fact that diagnoses de-
pend on information that is essentially
subjective and difficult to verify does
not elide the duty of professionals in
the field to elaborate well-grounded
concepts that comprehend the situa-
tion of the recipient at that moment,
which could improve the chances of
his life, since no professional can try
to shield himself with the excuse of
difficulties-such behavior has the po-
tential of perpetuating situations that
we see as being unjust.
It should be pointed out further, re-
garding the privilege or corruption fac-
tor, the fact of there being the presence
of a collegiate body of experts, such
as has been proposed here, would re-
duce these risks. Notwithstanding, it is
our judgment that it would be possi-
ble to have a periodic changing of
members of that collegiate, which
would reduce further those risks.
The details of the entire process as
to how all this would function can still
be better studied, but it is our opinion
that only with more serious and tech-
nical criteria, would it be possible to
achieve the aims of the legislator of
creating a one-and only waiting list,
maintaining what exists by that name,
today, but its nature should be
changed, so that it is organized, tak-
ing into account the needs of each re-
cipient.
CONCLUSIONS
 i) Bioethics, as an ethical compre-
hension of questions relative to life
and health, is intimately related to the
idea of justice and equality.
ii) Equality is only achieved by
treating unequally those who are un-
equal, in proportion to their inequali-
ties; i.e., giving each individual what
is rightfully theirs, respecting their in-
herent inequalities;
iii) Regulation 9,434/97 seeks to
give equal treatment to those in need
of transplants, not achieving, however,
the principle of justice and equality;
iv) The one-and-only waiting list,
based on the order of entry of the
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enrollment violates the principle of
equality, attributing equalitarian treat-
ment in unequal situations;
 v) The criteria established in art 37
§ 2 nd of the Regulation MS 3,407/98
becomes a teratology, when it stipu-
lates, in the one-and-only list system,
that the recipient who needs diverse
organs be subjected to the criteria for
distribution of the organ in greatest
demand;
vi) The objective criteria of prefer-
ence, established in Regulation MS
3,407/98, is insufficient and is not
wide enough in scope, requiring a
case-by-case evaluation of the risk of
death to the recipient;
vii) The risk and the possibility of
error in diagnosis, when there is a case-
by-case analysis, for purposes of inclu-
sion on the one-and only-waiting list,
are inherent in the exercise of medi-
cine, but what makes them different
from the risk factor alone is exactly the
possibility of having technical analy-
sis and there being the requirement of
a foundation to the determination;
viii) It is our judgment, thus, that
there exist a one-and-only waiting list,
divided up into organ categories and
organized according to the imminent
necessity of each recipient, based on
diagnoses by medical experts in the
field, who are to compose a collegiate
with periodic member replacement,
whose result will be that it function in
such manner that the position of each
recipient on that list be determined by
said collegiate, in a technical and es-
tablished manner, seeking, hence, the
principle of bioethics, as a corollary of
justice.
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
We know that the concepts of jus-
tice and equality are relative, and we
are aware of the uncomfortable situa-
tion of an individual who, waiting for
an organ, depends on the order of
enrollment in order to receive it; since,
we have no doubt that all lives have
the same value. In considering this, it
is our judgment that with jurisdiction
within the technical criteria, it is pos-
sible to attempt to achieve equality
more effectively, giving priority for
transplants to those individuals most
in need of them, without eliminating
the carrying out of transplants on
those who have conditions that enable
them to wait for longer periods of time.
Life is an absolute concept, which can-
not be compromised, especially with
the argument that people on waiting
lists die everywhere. We add to this ar-
gument that every day, every hour of
the day, every minute of the day,
deaths are registered for diverse causes,
as it is human nature, and not only by
reason of waiting lists, a motive for
which we cannot passively accept un-
equal situations, when we seek to save
the greatest possible number of lives,
as Hippocrates taught.
Therefore, bioethics, with an ethical
view of questions concerning human
life and health and with the principle
of justice (collective welfare) as a ful-
crum, cannot be far removed from the
discussion of such an important ques-
tion (raised, in terms of the law) that,
we contend, at the present time, ends up
transgressing the Aristotelian concept of
justice, which has been definitely incor-
porated in our ordering paradigms and
that teaches us that true equality is only
achieved by treating “unequals” (those
who are unequal or different, in terms
of conditions or circumstances) un-
equally (differentially), in proportion to
their inequalities (differences).
RESUMO
COHEN C e col. - Transplantes -
bioética e justiça. Rev. Hosp. Clín.
Fac. Med. S. Paulo 58(6):293-298,
2003.
A bioética, como ramo da filosofia
que enfoca as questões relativas a saú-
de e a vida humana, está intimamente
ligada à idéia de justiça e igualdade.
Desta forma, entendendo o conceito de
igualdade em sua acepção original, ou
seja, associando-o à idéia de tratar de-
sigualmente os desiguais na medida de
suas desigualdades, observamos que a
denominada “lista única de espera”
para transplantes, prevista na Lei
9.434/97, acaba por se afastar do con-
ceito de igualdade e justiça, nortea-
dores da bioética, mesmo consideran-
do os critérios objetivos de precedên-
cia previstos na Portaria n.o 3.407/98.
Assim, a organização dos transplantes
em lista única de espera, com tímidas
exceções para alguns casos, sem a aná-
lise técnica e fundamentada, caso por
caso, quanto à necessidade preeminen-
te, acaba institucionalizando desi-
gualdades, relegando os pacientes à
própria sorte e apartando-se, assim, da
ratio legis, que visa buscar maior jus-
tiça no que tange ao transplante de ór-
gãos. Concluímos, então, a partir da
análise da legislação e dos princípios
da bioética e justiça, pela necessidade
da criação de um colegiado de médi-
cos experts, que baseados em critérios
técnicos e de forma fundamentada,
possam analisar cada caso para fins de
inclusão na lista de espera, de acordo
com a necessidade e preeminência,
evitando-se, assim, que pessoas em si-
tuações desiguais sejam tratadas igual-
mente.
DESCRITORES: Bioética. Ética.
Igualdade. Justiça. Lei 9.434/97.
Lista única de espera. Transplantes.
Portaria 3.407/98.
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